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TH E WH ITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
April 19, 1983 
MEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING 
FROM: 
SUBJEC'l' : 
JOHN G. ROBERTS~ 
Department of Justice Recommendations 
on Creation of an Intercircuit Tribunal 
Jonathan Rose has transmitted for your consideration the 
conclusions of the Department of Justice with respect to the 
Chief Justice's proposal to create an intercircuit tribunal 
between the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court. 
Shortly after the Chief Justice announced his proposal the 
Attorney General formed a committee within the Department, 
chaired by Paul Bator and composed of most of the Assistant 
Attorneys General, to formulate a Department position. The 
committee has now completed its \vork, and issued a ten-page 
report. 
In a marked departure from previous Department positions on 
national court of appeals proposals, the committee 
recommended that the Department support creation of a 
temporary (five year) intercircuit tribunal to hear cases 
referred by the Supreme~Court. The decisions of the 
tribunal would be nationally binding, subject to further 
review by the Supreme Court. The committee proposed that 
the tribunal be composed of 7 or 9 court of appeals judges, 
rather than, as currently proposed in the pending bills, 
shifting panels of 5 or 7 drawn from a pool of 28 court of 
appeals judges. The committee also recommended that the 
Chief Justice select the judges to sit on the new court, 
subject to approval by the Supreme Court. The current bills 
provide for selection of the judges by Circuit Councils. 
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Reynolds 
dissented from the committee report and filed a statement 
detailing his reservations. 
As I explained in my February 10 memorandum to you on this 
subject, I think creation of a new intercircuit tribunal is 
exceedingly ill-advised. Nothing in the Department of 
Justice committee report dissuades me from this view. The 
President we serve has long campaigned against government 
bureaucracy and the excessive role of the federal courts, 
and yet the Department committee would have his Administra-
tion support creation of an additional bureaucratic 
structure to permit the federal courts to do more than they 
already do. What is particularly offensive from the unique 
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perspective of our office is the committee recommendation 
that judges be appointed to the new tribunal in a manner 
that not only constitutes an unprecedented infringement on 
the President's appointment powers, but ,.,ould go far in 
undermining the significance of our prior judicial 
appointments. 
The basic reason given by the committee to support creation 
of an intercircuit tribunal is the excessive workload on the 
Supreme Court. While some of the tales of woe emanating 
from the Court are enough to bring tears to the eyes, it is 
true that only Supreme Court Justices and schoolchildren are 
expected to and do take the entire summer off. Even assuming 
that the Justices have reached the limit of their capacity, 
it strikes me as misguided to take action to permit them to 
do more. There are practical limits on the capacity of the 
Justices, and those limits are a significant check preventing 
the Court from usurping even more of the prerogatives of the 
other branches. The generally-accepted notion that the 
Court can only hear roughly 150 cases each term gives the 
same sense of reassurance as the adjournment of the Court in 
July, when we know that the Constitution is safe for the 
summer. Creating a tribunal to relieve the Court of some 
cases -- with the result that the Court will have the 
opportunity to fill the gap with new cases -- augments the 
power of the judicial branch, ineluctably at the expense of 
the executive branch. In this respect it is highly signifi-
cant to note that the committee conceded that the executive 
branch is not adversely affected by the Court's workload: 
"The Department has a high success rate with its petitions 
for certiorari; and no Division reports substantial dissatis-
faction with its ability to get conflicts resolved." 
It is also far from certain that the proposed tribunal will 
in fact reduce the workload of the Court. As noted above, 
it seems probable (to me, at least) that if the new tribunal 
relieves the Court of 40 cases, the Court's eventual response 
will be to take 40 new cases it otherwise would not have to 
fill the void. Even aside from this, the new scheme will 
increase the workload by (1) making initial review of a 
petition more complicated and time-consuming, since a new 
option -- referral to the tribunal -- must be considered; 
(2) requiring review of the decisions of the new tribunal; 
and (3) increasing filings as lawyers perceive increased 
opportunities for review after decision by the Court of 
Appeals. In his memorandum to you, Rose states that "Only 
actual experience with such a tribunal can take the argu-
ments for and against an enlarged appellate capacity at the 
national level out of the realm of conjecture and provide a 
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concrete evidentiary basis for assessing this approach." 
This is total abdication of reason, tantamount 
to arguing that the only way to determine if a bridge can 
hold a lO-ton truck is to drive one across it. And the 
critical assumption -- that this is only a five-year experi-
ment -- strikes me as unfounded. Once the tribunal becomes 
a part of the federal judicial bureaucracy there will be no 
chance to abolish it, particularly if, as I strongly suspect, 
the Supreme Court promptly fills its caseload to capacity 
even with the aid of the tribunal. 
The most objectionable aspect of the committee's report is 
its recommendation that the Chief Justice select the members 
of the new court, subject to approval by the Supreme Court. 
The power of the tribunal -- to reverse Courts of Appeals 
and provide nationally-binding legal interpretations -- is 
significantly different from the power currently exercised 
by sitting Court of Appeals judges. When those judges were 
appointed and confirmed it was not envisioned that they 
would exercise such power. The proposal would create 
essentially new and powerful judicial positions, and the 
President should not willingly yield authority to appoint 
the members of what would become the Nation's second most 
powerful court. The "precedents" cited by the committee --
appointment of district judges to sit on circuit courts, and 
selection of members of specialized judicial panels --
strike me as qualitatively different from the proposal under 
consideration. Such "precedents" do not, in any event, 
explain why we should sacrifice the Constitutionally-based 
appointment power of the President. 
Further, requiring approval of the Supreme Court for appoint-
ments ensures that the new tribunal will be either bland or 
polarized, depending on whether the Court splits the seats 
(a Bork for Rehnquist, a Skelly Wright for Marshal) or 
proceeds by consensus (I cannot immediately think of an 
example agreeable to both Rehnquist and Marshal). In either 
case the new court will assuredly not represent the Presi-
dent's judicial philosophy -- and will have the authority to 
reverse decisions from courts to which the President has 
been able to make several appointments that do reflect his 
judicial philosophy .. under the committee proposal a carter-1 
appointed judge (there definitely will have to be some on 
the new court) could write a nationally-binding opinion 
reversing an opinion by Bork, Winter, Posner, or Scalia -- _ 
something that cannot happen now. 
The Justice Department must soon respond to inquiries from 
the Senate subcommittee considering the pertinent bills, and 
Rose accordingly would appreciate "a prompt White House 
response." I await your guidance on what type of response 
to prepare. 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
February 10, 1983 
MEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING 
FROM: JOHN G. ROBERTS 9~ 
SUBJECT: Chief Justice's Proposals 
The Chief Justice devoted his Annual Report on the State of 
the Judiciary to the problem of the case load of the Supreme 
Court, a problem highlighted by several of the Justices over 
the course of last year. The Chief Justice proposed two 
steps to address and redress this problem: creation of "an 
independent Congressionally authorized body appointed by the 
three Branches of Government" to develop long-term remedies, 
and the immediate creation of a special temporary panel of 
Circuit Judges to hear cases referred to it by the Supreme 
Court -- typically cases involving conflicts between the 
Courts of Appeals. 
It is difficult to develop compelling arguments either for 
or against the proposal to create another commission to 
study problems of the judiciary. The Freund and Hruska 
committees are generally recognized to have made valuable 
contributions to the study of our judicial system -- but few 
of their recommendations have been adopted. I suspect that 
there has been enough study of judicial problems and possible 
remedies, but certainly would not want to oppose a modest 
proposal for more study emanating from the Chief Justice. 
The more significant afflatus from the Chief Justice is his 
proposal for immediate creation of a temporary court between 
the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court, to decide cases 
involving inter-circuit conflicts referred to it by the 
Supreme Court. The Chief would appoint 26 circuit judges --
two from each circuit -- to sit on the court in panels of 
seven or nine. The Chief estimates that this would relieve 
the Supreme Court of 35 to 50 of its roughly 140 cases 
argued each term. The Supreme Court would retain certiorari 
review of decisions of the new court. 
It is not at all clear, however, that the new court would 
actually reduce the Court's workload as envisioned by the 
Chief. The initial review of cases from the Courts of 
Appeals would become more complicated and time-consuming. 
Justices would have to decide not simply whether to grant or 
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deny certioriari, but whether to grant, deny, or refer to 
the new court. Cases on certiorari from the new court would 
be an entirely new burden, and a significant one, since 
denials of certiorari of decisions from the new court will 
be-far more significant as a precedential matter than 
denials of cases from the various circuits. The existence 
of a new opportunity for review can also be expected to have 
the perverse effect of increasing Supreme Court filings: 
lawyers who now recognize that they have little chance for 
Supreme Court review may file for the opportunity of review 
by the new court. 
Judge Henry Friendly has argued that any sort of new court 
between the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court would 
undermine the morale of circuit judges. At a time when low 
salaries make it difficult to attract the ablest candidates 
for the circuit bench, I do not think this objection should 
be lightly dismissed. Others have argued that conflict in 
the circuits is not really a pressing problem, but rather a 
healthy means by which the law develops. A new court might 
even increase conflict by adding another voice to the 
discordant chorus of judicial interpretation, in the course 
of resolving precise questions. 
The proposal to have the Chief Justice select the members of 
the new court is also problematic. While the Chief can be 
expected to choose judges generally acceptable to us, 
liberal members of Congress, the courts, and the bar are 
likely to object. In addition, as lawyers for the Execu-
tive, we should scrupulously guard the President's appoint-
ment powers. While the Chief routinely appoints sitting 
judges to specialized panels, the new court would be quali-
tatively different than those panels, and its members would 
have significantly greater powers_than regular circuit 
judges. 
My own view is that creation of a new tier of judicial 
review is a terrible idea. The Supreme Court to a large 
extent (and, if mandatory jurisdiction is abolished, as 
proposed by the Chief and the Administration, completely) 
controls its own workload, in terms of arguments and 
opinions. The fault lies with the Justices themselves, who 
unnecessarily take too many cases and issue opinions so 
confusing that they often do not even resolve the question 
presented. If the Justices truly think they are overworked, 
the cure lies close at hand. For example, giving coherence 
to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by adopting the "good 
faith" standard, and abdicating the role of fourth or fifth 
guesser in death penalty cases, would eliminate about a 




So long as the Court views itself as ultimately responsible 
for governing all aspects of our society, it will, 
understandably, be overworked. A new court will not solve 
this problem. 
